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Private Law and Public Policy: Negligence Law and Political
Change in Nineteenth-Century North Carolina
The movement to create a new legal history is now underway.I At least one
legal scholar has recently suggested that legal history may be in the midst of a
"golden age."'2 Over the past thirty years literature on the subject has poured
forth from law reviews, historical journals, and university presses.3 The volume
of new material, however, does not reflect a unanimity of perspective. Disagree-
ment prevails, especially on broad interpretive issues.4 On the left, neo-Marxists
posit an interpretation that emphasizes the exploitative nature of American law.
Marshalling evidence of class tension, these historians have been especially influ-
ential since the late 1970s. 5 The majority of legal historians, 6 however, might be
described for lack of better terms as either liberal or conservative pluralists. Lib-
erals prefer to emphasize that although the legal system has achieved some give-
and-take among competing social groups, there has been a bit more "take" than
"give" on the part of the elite.7 Conservatives argue that legal rules have been
shaped largely by considerations other than self-aggrandizement. 8 Finally, a
"Law and Economics" perspective9 assumes that the law has been shaped by a
desire to achieve economic efficiency. 10 This view, as narrow intellectual history,
has limited usefulness for broader historical explanation.11 Its conclusions tend
to bolster the arguments of the conservative pluralists. 12
1. See W. NELSON & P. REID, THE LITERATURE OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1985);
Friedman, American Legal History: Past, and Present, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 563 (1984); Gordon, Re-
cent Trends in Legal Historiography, 69 L. LIBR. J. 462 (1976); Hurst, Old and New Dimensions of
Research in United States Legal History, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 1 (1979); Note, The New Legal
History: A Review Essay, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 205 (1978).
2. Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C.L. REv. 77, 77-78 (1985).
3. Evidence of the vastness of the new material is found in a five-volume bibliography. K.
HALL, A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HIS-
TORY, 1896-1979 (1984).
4. See, L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985); M. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS
OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); W. NELSON, AMERICANI-
ZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-
1830 (1975); G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1980).
5. Such works are associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement. See W. NELSON & P.
REID, supra note 1, at 261-66. Prominent studies from this perspective include M. HORWITZ, supra
note 4, and M. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860 (1981).
6. See W. NELSON & P. REID, supra note 1, at 261-302.
7. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 475-76; Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute
Liability, 37 VA. L, REV. 359, 396-97 (1951); Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth
Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1773 (1981).
8. G. WHITE, supra note 4, at 12-19; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1717; Gordon, Book Review,
94 HARV. L. REV. 903, 905-08 (1981) (reviewing G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTEL-
LECTUAL HISTORY (1980)).
9. See LefF, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451
(1974).
10. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 73 (1972).
11. Judge Posner's methodology in the article cited, which describes a database of cases decided
at 10-year intervals, systematically excludes any information on the reasoning or outcome of the
cases other than materials mentioned explicitly in the cases themselves. See id. at 34-35.
12. Judge Posner argues that an effort to achieve economic efficiency, rather than economic
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Each of these schools presents its own history of the development of tort
law. Morton Horwitz, a leading proponent of the neo-Marxist view, argues that
commercial interests conspired to forge a system of rules that promoted indus-
trial development.' 3 Although agreeing with Horwitz' views about the funda-
mental purpose of negligence law, Lawrence Friedman rejects Horwitz'
conspiracy thesis.14 Friedman posits that no single group was able to create and
maintain negligence doctrine. 15 Finally, both G. Edward White' 6 and Gary
Schwartz 17 disagree with the emphasis on economics propounded by Horwitz
and Friedman. White accepts the conclusion that the development produced
social winners and losers, but emphasizes changes in the thinking of lawyers and
judges, and downplays the importance of the external forces of economic trans-
formation.18 Schwartz rejects the "subsidy thesis" altogether.' 9 By focusing on
the effect of negligence rules, he denies that tort law acted to support certain
economic interests.20
This Note addresses whether any of these approaches successfully explains
the early development of negligence law in North Carolina. The Note gives
special attention to both the reasoning and the outcome of appellate cases.21
North Carolina is an appropriate forum for study because as an eastern state it
was settled well before 1800,22 and because case reports date from 1778.23 More
significantly, it is a southern state,24 and the southern response to negligence has
been sadly neglected. Historians know little about how negligence law devel-
oped in the context of slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction, or under the
regimes of New South Bourbons or agrarian Populist-Fusionist radicals.
25
North Carolina's experience is particularly instructive because dramatic
changes in the State's political orientation resulted in massive and abrupt shifts
in the composition of the state supreme court. Before the Civil War, the court
subsidy of infant industries, provides a basis for understanding late nineteenth century tort law. See
id.
13. See M. HORWITZ, supra note 4, at 98-99.
14. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 467-87.
15. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 467-87.
16. G. WHITE, supra note 4, at 3.
17. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1772-75.
18. G. WHITE, supra note 4, at 3.
19. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1717-18.
20. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1717-18.
21. The research involved locating and reading every North Carolina negligence case that in-
volved claims of damage to livestock or persons between 1780 and 1900. The research also focused
on cases involving damage to freight by common carriers decided before 1870, as well as some cases
in this category after 1870. The North Carolina Supreme Court was the only appellate court in the
State until 1968.
22. Permanent settlement began during the 1650s. By 1800, North Carolina's population
ranked third among the states. See H. LEFLER & A. NEWSOME, THE HISTORY OF A SOUTHERN
STATE: NORTH CAROLINA 17, 321 (3d ed. 1973).
23. See State v. Smith, I N.C. (Mart.) 13 (1778).
24. The prospects of southern legal history recently have been addressed in AMBIVALENT LEG-
ACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH (D. Bodenhamer & J. Ely eds. 1984); Finkelman, supra
note 2; Symposium on the Legal History of the South, 32 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1979).
25. Paul Finkelman has noted that legal historians have written primarily about law in Massa-
chusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Wisconsin. Finkelman, supra note 2, at 78.
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reflected the electoral success of prorailroad and prodevelopment Whigs. After
the war, a new state constitution and the rise of the Republican party reshaped
the court in a Republican mold. In the late 1870s, conservative prorailroad
Democrats won control of the court from the Republicans. Finally, antirailroad
agrarian radicals and their Republican allies swept the Democrats off the court
in 1894, when the judiciary was a leading campaign issue.2 6
This Note concludes that any effort to describe the development of tort law
without careful attention to political events or consideration of judges as repre-
sentatives of political parties will be deficient. 27 Because tort law is a state phe-
nomenon, many of its sources must be analyzed in a local context. Overarching
economic or intellectual perspectives or studies of case reports alone tend to
isolate decisions from their historical context and result in inappropriate peri-
odization.28 Legal history must be written with a sensitivity to both political
history and chronological development.
Modem negligence law originated in the decisions of nineteenth-century
judges.29 Four concepts in particular were articulated during the formative pe-
riod of legal fault: negligence, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and
the fellow servant rule.30 Negligence was stated broadly as a failure to do that
which "a reasonable man of ordinary prudence... would be expected to do."1
3 1
Yet failure to act in such a manner did not always produce liability. Contribu-
tory negligence barred a plaintiff's recovery whenever the plaintiff contributed
"to the harm he has suffered" by acting "below the [reasonableness] standard to
which he is required to conform for his own protection."'32 Moreover, if the
plaintiff was found to have relieved "the defendant of an obligation of [nonnegli-
gent] conduct toward him," there was no liability because the plaintiff was con-
sidered to have "assumed the risk" of injury.33 Finally, nineteenth-century
courts extended the assumption of risk doctrine in the employer-employee rela-
tionship to include "fellow servants." Employers were not liable for personal
26. Although Democrats have controlled the North Carolina Supreme Court for the past 80
years, the rise of competitive Republicanism in the 1970s renewed debate over the politics of the
supreme court. For example, during the election of supreme court justices in 1986 Republicans
formed "Citizens for a Conservative Court" and criticized the "liberal" views of some Democratic
jurists. Moreover, demands in the 1987 North Carolina General Assembly for a nonelective, non-
partisan system of judicial selection prompted Democratic Lieutenant Governor Robert Jordan to
observe that "even in the legal profession" there are persons who believe that nonelective judges are
not "as in tune" to public sentiment as they should be. Durham Morning Herald, Feb. 13, 1987, at
17A, col. 2.
27. Even legal historians convinced about the connection between law and politics generally
have not bothered to connect tort developments with specific political movements. See, e.g., L.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 299-302, 476; M. HORWITZ, supra note 4, at 256-57.
28. An example of the problem of periodization appears in Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1719.
Schwartz analyzes almost 100 years of history in categories of "late nineteenth century" and "mid-
nineteenth century." Such a perspective fails to appreciate shifting party alignments or significant
changes in court membership. Both of these factors are critical in the decision making process.
29. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 467-87.
30. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 467-87.
31. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 150 (4th ed. 1971).
32. Id. at 417.
33. Id. at 440.
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injuries to employees "caused solely by the negligence of a fellow servant." '34
Although the major doctrines of negligence were not widely used until the
middle of the nineteenth century, the law governing legal fault did not arise in a
vacuum. Rather, rules relating to various kinds of civil wrongs were well estab-
lished in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. However, legal histori-
ans disagree about the precise manner in which these rules worked. One
problem is whether and when strict liability in tort preceded the general applica-
tion of negligence. 35 For example, Horwitz argues that tort actions in 1800 were
decided by assuming strict liability.36 In contrast, Schwartz, although he sug-
gests that tort law was rather ill-formed until about 1850, contends that even in
1800 strict liability did not fully encompass the way in which courts viewed tort
disputes.37
Before 1840, relatively few North Carolina cases involved tort claims. Dur-
ing the early nineteenth century, the application of a standard of neglect or strict
liability depended entirely on the nature of the relationship between the two
disputants. Apparently, no one sought recovery from a stranger on a vague no-
tion of a general duty to prevent harm. Instead, persons sought relief from pub-
lic servants such as clerks, 38 sheriffs, 39 or overseers of public roads, 40 or from
persons involved in contractual arrangements such as bailees.4 1 In some of these
cases, the plaintiffs were required to show a kind of neglect.42 Despite the appar-
ent similarity with modem tort language, courts left unclear the precise meaning
of "neglect." Early North Carolina judges used the word to mean both fault
and strict liability. 43 Neglect meant fault, or lack of due care, in cases involving
public clerks, bailees, and overseers of roads. 44 For example, as early as 1792 a
superior court instructed a jury that a defendant was responsible only to the rule
"which results from natural justice, which requires no more of him than com-
mon and usual prudence and diligence in the performance of what he has under-
taken." 45 In contrast, sheriffs and common carriers of goods could be held to
strict liability.46 One court noted that common carriers were liable for "all
34. Id. at 528.
35. See Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L.
REv. 925, 926-28 (1981).
36. M. HORWITZ, supra note 4, at 85.
37. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1722-34.
38. See, e.g., Coltraine v. McCain, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 308 (1832).
39. See, e.g., Wingate v. Galloway, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 6 (1824).
40. See, e.g., Hathaway v. Hinton, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 243 (1853).
41. See, e.g., Hilliard v. Dortch, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 246 (1824).
42. See, e.g., - v. Jackson, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 14, 16 (1792).
43. Compare Adams v. Turrentine, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 147, 149-63 (1847) (negligence means
strict liability) with Spivey v. Farmer's Adm'r, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 339, 340 (1805) (liability based on
fault).
44. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
45. Jackson, 2 N.C. (I Hayw.) at 16.
46. See Adams, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) at 149-63 (sheriffs); Mabry v. Turrentine, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.)
201, 204-10 (1847) (sheriffs); Harrell v. Owens, 18 N.C. (I Dev. & Bat.) 273, 275-76 (1835) (common
carrier); Adam v. Hay, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) 149, 149 (1819) (common carrier); Rainey v. Dunning, 6
N.C. (2 Mur.) 386, 387 (1818) (sheriffs); Backhouse v. Sneed, 5 N.C. (I Mur.) 173, 174 (1808)
(common carrier); Jackson, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) at 15 (common carrier).
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losses except such as happen by the act of God or the enemies of the state." 4 7
Likewise, a sheriff was responsible for "negligent escape" of a prisoner, even if
there was no negligence.48
Because of this coexistence of fault and strict liability, neither negligence
nor strict liability gained recognition as a special branch of the law.49 Not until
the 1850s was "negligence" regularly included in the indexes of case reports,50
and by 1854 the leading digest of North Carolina cases still lacked any citations
to "negligence" cases.5 1 Instead, fault concepts were embedded in disputes in-
volving bailments, overseers of roads, and hirers of slaves. Similarly, strict lia-
bility was another procedural and substantive rule exercised wholly within the
law of specific kinds of relationships. Therefore, each of these relationships had
its own basis in common law for applying strict liability.
Changing political and economic circumstances in North Carolina, how-
ever, brought about a reconsideration of ideas about negligence or fault. This
reconsideration was affected dramatically by renewed political party competition
in the 1830s.5 2 Public political debate between the newly formed Whigs and the
older Democrats focused on whether public funds should be used to support
internal improvements.5 3 Two developments enhanced the importance of inter-
nal improvements. First, many leaders came to believe that without a transpor-
tation system linking eastern and western counties large areas of western North
Carolina would remain permanently undeveloped.5 4 Second, by the early 1830s
the railroad had become economically feasible.5 5 Politicians of both parties re-
lied on these developments in embarking on a campaign to remake the State
with internal improvements. The plan had immediate and widespread appeal,
and prodevelopment sentiments substantially controlled the state general assem-
bly between 1836 and 1850.56
This political support, which seemed virtually unanimous by the 1850s,
provided the basis for a massive public subsidy of the railroads.5 7 Bonds
47. Backhouse, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) at 174. The court reasoned that "persons induced to confide in
[carriers] in the course of business may receive all possible security." Id.
48. See, eg., Adams, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) at 149-63. On the other hand, sheriffs were scrutinized
under a fault standard for other kinds of wrongs. See, eg., Sherrill v. Shuford, 32 N.C. (10 Ired.)
200 (1849) (fault standard applied regarding execution of process).
49. In North Carolina the evidence tends not to support Horwitz' thesis. See supra text accom-
panying note 36. Instead, the sparsity and nature of the cases lend support to both Rabin's asser-
tions about a lack of general liability and Schwartz' suggestion that strict liability prevailed in only a
few situations. See Rabin, supra note 35, at 926-28, 938; Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1730-34.
50. See, e.g., 51 N.C. (8 Jones) 589-90 (1858-59) (index reference to negligence cases).
51. See H. JONES, A DIGEST OF REPORTED CASES DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
NORTH CAROLINA, 1845-1853 (1854).
52. Williams, Reemergence of the Two-Party System, in THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE:
AN INTERPRETIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 242-45 (L. Butler & A. Watson eds. 1984) [here-
inafter THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE].
53. Jeffrey, Internal Improvements and Political Parties in Antebellum North Carolina, 1836-
1860, 55 N.C. HIsT. REV. 111, 150 (1978); Williams, supra note 52, at 246-47.
54. Williams, supra note 52, at 246; see Jeffrey, supra note 53, at 111-14.
55. C. BROWN, A STATE MOVEMENT IN RAILROAD DEVELOPMENT 15-16 (1928).
56. Williams, supra note 52, at 247-48.
57. H. LEFLER & A. NEWSOME, supra note 22, at 364-65.
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amounting to millions of dollars were issued for several railroads.58 By the
1850s the State was the primary stockholder in the North Carolina Railroad
Company, which eventually connected Goldsboro in the east with Charlotte in
the westA9 Railroads soon were able to cut freight rates by half, and cheaper
transportation costs increased farm productivity.60 The railroad did not change
the fundamentally rural character of the State, but public leadership, public sup-
port, and public money combined to bring about a transportation revolution.6'
The impact of the railroad on tort law was spectacular. 62 Railroads imme-
diately forced the North Carolina Supreme Court to decide a wholly new kind of
dispute.63 Earlier tort decisions had been analyzed according to the nature of
the relationship between the disputants. In the new area of railroad law, how-
ever, whether railroads would be held to a standard of negligence, strict liability,
or something in between was in doubt.64 Significantly, between 1840 and 1859
the three-judge North Carolina Supreme Court 65 was dominated by leading
Whigs and reflected prevailing prorailroad sentiment. 66 Most prominent among
the court's judges were William Gaston,67 Thomas Ruffin,68 and Richmond
Pearson. 69 These men authored the first opinions elaborating new negligence
doctrines. Three decisions between 1840 and 1860 reflected an explicit choice by
the court to make liability contingent on proving negligence rather than strict
liability.
The first modem North Carolina negligence case was Ellis v. Portsmouth &
58. Williams, supra note 52, at 246-47.
59. H. LEFLER & A. NEWSOME, supra note 22, at 365; Watson, "Old Rip" and a New Era, in
THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE, supra note 52, at 225.
60. H. LEFLER & A. NEwSOME, supra note 22, at 366.
61. See Watson, supra note 59, at 222-25.
62. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 262-64 (assessing impact of railroads on law in a na-
tional context).
63. The earliest railroad case in North Carolina was Raleigh & G.R.R. v. Davis, 19 N.C. (2
Dev. & Bat.) 451 (1837) (recognizing railroads' powers of eminent domain); see also J. Carlson, The
Iron Horse in Court: Thomas Ruffin and the Development of North Carolina Railroad Law 198-200
(1972) (unpublished master's thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (arguing Ruflin
favored railroad development).
64. Because there was no specific North Carolina railroad law before the 1830s, and because the
law of torts remained somewhat submerged, the court had almost complete freedom to determine
whether railroad cases would be analyzed on a strict liability or fault basis.
65. The North Carolina Supreme Court was created in 1818. Before the constitution of 1868,
judges were elected by vote of the general assembly. K. BATrLE, AN ADDRESS ON THE HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT 40, 45-46 (1889).
66. Between 1840 and 1859 the six members of the court were Thomas Ruffin (1833-52, 1858-
59); Frederick Nash (1844-58); Richmond Pearson (1849-68); Joseph Daniel (1833-48); William
Gaston (1833-44); and William H. Battle (1848, 1852-65). Pearson, Gaston, Nash, and Battle were
Whigs. Ruffin was a prodevelopment Democrat. See NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, 1585-
1979, at 360-61 (J. Cheney ed. 1981) [hereinafter NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT].
67. See Clark, The Supreme Court of North Carolina (pt. II), 4 GREEN BAG 523, 523-29 (1892).
68. See Clark, The Supreme Court of North Carolina (pt. 1), 4 GREEN BAG 467, 467-74 (1892).
69. See Clark, The Supreme Court of North Carolina (pt. III), 4 GREEN BAG 535, 535-39
(1892). Before the constitutions of 1866 and 1868, the members of the supreme court were described
as "judges" with the exception of the Chief Justice. After 1866, they became Associate Justices. See
N.C. CONST. of 1865, art. IV, § 2 (1866); N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 8; K. BATTLE, supra note
65, at 40.
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Roanoke Railroad. 70 In Ellis, a locomotive accidentally set fire to a fence bor-
dering the company's tracks.71 At the trial, the judge applied the rule of nui-
sance law that "every one is bound so to use his own property as not to injure his
neighbor."'72 Although affirming the result, Judge Gaston moved to strike any
possiblity of strict liability, and held that "no man, unless he has engaged to
become insurer . . . against unavoidable accidents, is responsible for damage
sustained against his will and without his fault."'73 The court reasoned that
when a plaintiff "shows damage resulting from [an] act, which act, with the
exertion of proper care, does not ordinarily produce damage," he has made out a
prima facie case which can only be rebutted by "proof of care or of some ex-
traordinary accident which renders care useless." 74
Ellis made it clear that plaintiffs were required to prove more than mere
damage before they could recover. By 1849 the supreme court was prepared to
place another burden on plaintiffs: the defense of contributory negligence. Her-
ring v. Wilmington & Raleigh Railroad75 involved a claim by a slaveholder for
the negligent destruction of his property. Defendant's train struck and killed
one slave and badly injured another. Both slaves had fallen asleep on defend-
ant's track.76 Judge Richmond Pearson, writing for the court, held that the
defendant's servants reasonably assumed the slaves would move before the train
struck them.77 Despite their legal status as property, "the negroes were reason-
able beings, endowed with intelligence, as well as the instinct of self-preservation
and the power of locomotion."'7 8 Thus, the court held that defendant was not
negligent.79 Encouraged by both parties, however, Judge Pearson described
how contributory negligence could be applied.80 He noted that when both sides
are negligent, neither litigant can recover unless there is "wanton injury or gross
70. 24 N.C. (2 Ired.) 138 (1841).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 140. It was some time before trial attorneys and judges were comfortable with the
idea of fault in railroad cases. See, e.g., Garris v. Portsmouth & R.R.R., 24 N.C. (2 Ired.) 324
(1842). In Garris the trial judge instructed the jury that "the killing of the steer being admitted, the
plaintiff was entitled to recover," because any defense by the defendant might "deprive the plaintiff
of his right of recovery." Id. at 325. The supreme court awarded a new trial on the basis that strict
liability was inappropriate. Id. Moreover, Judge Gaston's use of "insurer" in Ellis suggests the
special contractual nature of strict liability for sheriffs and common carriers. See Ellis, 24 N.C. (2
Ired.) at 141.
74. Ellis, 24 N.C. (2 Ired.) at 141; see also Garris, 24 N.C. (2 Ired.) at 325 ("A merely acciden-
tal involuntary trespass may be justified.").
75. 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 402 (1849), overruled by Deans v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 107 N.C. 686,
12 S.E. 77 (1890).
76. Id. at 402-03.
77. Id. at 407-08. The result might have been different if the slaves had been wooden logs or
cows. "Wood has neither the instinct of self-preservation nor the power of locomotion." Id. at 408.
A cow might lose its "natural apprehension of danger by frequently seeing and hearing the [railroad]
cars." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The attorneys for both sides focused on the issue, and cited a group of English cases that
went far beyond the current state of North Carolina law. Ellis, Garris, and Herring suggest that
before 1850 the court was still relying on English, not American, precedent. See Herring, 32 N.C.
(10 Ired.) at 409.
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neglect" by one party.81 Judge Pearson seemed to equate all kinds of neglect
except "gross neglect," and argued that if "both are in equal fault, if one can
recover so can the other, and thus there would [wrongly] be mutual faults and
mutual recoveries."'82 Judge Pearson added that the rule was intended to keep
persons off railroad tracks, because a knowledge of impunity from liability
"would be an inducement to obstruct the highway and render it impossible for
the company to discharge [its] duty to the public, as common carriers. '"83
One other case decided between 1840 and 1860 that illustrates the
prorailroad development of early negligence law is Ponton v. Wilmington & Wel-
don Railroad.8 4 The dispute in Ponton concerned the death of a hired slave,
who was crushed by two trains when a fellow employee failed to adjust switches
at a station.85 Judge Ruffin, after summarizing the relevant English and Ameri-
can cases in his opinion, recognized the fellow servant doctrine in North Caro-
lina.86 His argument emphasized that the rule was so well settled in other
jurisdictions that the court would follow the law of those other states.87 None-
theless, Ruffin justified the ruling as one "founded on policy and social neces-
sity."'8 8  He reasoned that employees, when contracting for employment,
implicitly agreed that they would be unable to recover from the employer for a
fellow servant's negligence.8 9 Judge Ruffin dismissed as unwarranted any dis-
81. Id.
82. Judge Pearson's statement, of course, ignores the possiblity of different damages, a result
not unlikely in railroad cases. The use of the word "equal" also is revealing, because it precluded the
early use of comparative negligence. Comparative negligence, which prevails in 43 states but not in
North Carolina, apportions damages according to degree of fault. Contributory negligence as a
complete bar to recovery is abolished under the rule. See 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE
LAW OF TORTS 263 n.6 (2d ed. 1986).
83. Herring, 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) at 408-09. The decision hardly serves as proof that transporta-
tion interests took precedence over slave interests. Nonetheless, it does indicate how the North Caro-
lina court reacted when confronted with the competing interests of a railroad and an individual
slaveholder.
84. 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 245 (1858).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 246. The fellow servant rule barred the plaintiff's recovery when injury resulted from
the negligence of a "fellow servant" of the plaintiff. See 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra
note 82, at 77 n.22. Judge Ruffin chose to rely, in particular, on Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep.
1030 (1837), and Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). He noted that North
Carolina law would not follow the initial rejection of the rule in Ohio. Ponton, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) at
247; see generally Little Miami R.R. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415 (1851) (rejecting fellow employee rule);
L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JusTIcE SHAW 166-82 (1957) (extended
discussion of Farwell and its author); Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule: The Fellow
Servant Rule, 1837-1860, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (1984) (examining origins of fellow servant rule
and its exceptions).
87. Ponton, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) at 246-47; Comment, supra note 86, at 613 n.205.
88. Ponton, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) at 246. These reasons were supplied partly by Lord Abinger,
author of Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837); see also Comment, supra note 86, at 584-90
(arguing that policy reasons supporting Priestly in England were actually a limited effort to extend
eighteenth century master-servant relations to newer employer-employee relations). Judge Ruffin,
however, had his own reasons for applying the rule in North Carolina. He was well aware that the
fellow servant doctrine had its primary cause and justification in the modem demands of nineteenth
century industrialization. In Ponton he recognized the rule was "of recent occurrence anywhere and
owes its origins, or rather prevalence, probably to the great number of servants needed and employed
on the steamboats and railroads, which have come so much into use in our times, and on which so
many casualties or injuries from negligence happen." Ponton, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) at 246.
89. Ponton, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) at 246.
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tinction between a hired freedman and a slave, who had no power to contract,
because the master could contract and sue for recovery.
90
By 1860 the new negligence law was firmly established in North Carolina.
Due care, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant doctrine were a com-
mon part of North Carolina lawyers' discourse. During the antebellum period,
several kinds of cases involving negligence were decided by the court. A few
suits were analogous to the older status or contractual relationship decisions.
9 1
However, between 1840 and 1860 the largest group of negligence cases-and
most of the cases in which the new doctrines were stated-were related to rail-
roads. The majority of railroad disputes fell into two distinct categories: de-
struction of livestock92 and destruction of slave property. 93 Considering the
favorable political and judicial climate for railroads, it is not surprising that the
new legal rules largely worked in the favor of railroad interests. Although there
were less than fifteen such railroad cases altogether, the railroads or their agents
won almost all the slave injury cases, 94 and initially prevailed under the court's
view of negligence cases involving livestock.95 Only after the general assembly
changed the law in 1857 by creating a burden of proof on the railroad in live-
stock cases did plaintiffs tend to prevail in that category.
96
The language and reasoning of the railroad decisions also evinced the
court's predisposition to railroad interests. First, all decisions had the effect of
placing burdens on the plaintiff rather than the defendant. 97 This was especially
true in Ponton and Herring,98 in which Judges Pearson and Ruffin chose to rec-
ognize a rule that denied recovery even if the defendant or his agent was negli-
gent. Second, the court decided to follow precedent selectively.99 Although
90. Id. at 247-48. Judge Ruffin suggested the injustice of allowing a slave to recover when a
freedman could not. Id. at 248; see also Finkelman, supra note 2, at 94 (noting that North Carolina
was the only southern state to apply the fellow servant rule to slaves).
91. See, e.g., Woodard v. Hancock, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 384 (1860) (medical malpractice); Garrett
v. Freeman, 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 78 (1857) (violation of statutory restraints on burnings); Averitt v.
Murrell, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 322 (1857) (same).
92. See, e.g., Laws v. North Carolina R.R., 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 468 (1860); Montgomery v.
Wilmington & W.R.R., 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 464 (1859); Scott v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 49 N.C. (4
Jones) 432 (1857).
93. See, e.g., Haden v. North Carolina R.R., 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 362 (1861); Poole v. North
Carolina R.R., 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 340 (1861); Ponton v. Wilmington & W.R.R. 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 245
(1858); Couch v. Jones, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 402 (1857).
94. See cases cited supra note 93.
95. See Scott v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 432 (1857).
96. Act of Feb. 2, 1857, ch. 7, § 1, 1856-57 N.C. Sess. Laws 6, 6 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 62-241 (1982)). Because the only witness to most livestock accidents was an employee of the
railroad, the original rule made opportunities for recovery for killed livestock difficult. Tables I and
2 in the Appendix reveal the outcome of early North Carolina negligence cases. Several factors
deserve special mention. First, all of the plaintiffs' successes in livestock actions occurred after pas-
sage of the 1857 statute. Second, railroad defendants were especially successful in the injured "per-
sons" disputes, in which contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule had their greatest effect.
Third, there is a great discrepancy between the success of plaintiffs in nonlivestock, nonrailroad
property appeals and those same decisions in railroad cases. Finally, the overall effect of contribu-
tory negligence is dramatically illustrated by the fact that slaveholders lost 10 of the 11 suits for
compensation for "damaged" slaves.
97. See supra notes 62-83 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
99. For example, the court approved of Priestly v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837), and
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Judge Ruffin's language in Ponton seemed to follow "pure reason," it plainly
rejected what were considered judicial norms in other jurisdictions. 100 Finally,
the prorailroad characteristics of early North Carolina tort law were made more
palatable by the lack of a single legal standard recognizing recovery for personal
injury. Of course, slaves were incapable of suing in their own right: they were
trapped in an unfortunate position that emphasized their legal status as prop-
erty. Nonetheless, the court recognized them as human beings for purposes of
contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule. The North Carolina court
tried to accommodate the apparent contradiction, quite ironically, by treating
the slave as the first model of the reasonable person. 101
Between 1869 and 1879, as in the antebellum period, North Carolina negli-
gence law reflected political and economic developments. The decline in rail-
road operations during the Civil War led to a precipitate drop in the number of
negligence cases before the court.10 2 As a result, there were no important fault
cases between 1863 and 1869. Nonetheless, by the 1870s the volume of negli-
gence cases increased and the court began to reconsider its earlier decisions. As
had been true before 1860, the supreme court of the 1870s considered the usual
disputes involving killed or injured livestock, 10 3 miscellaneous damages to per-
sonal and real property,"°4 and contractual relationships, especially contracts
involving the railroads as common carriers of freight.10 5 Most importantly, par-
ties brought personal injury suits before the court for the first time. As a result,
the two major negligence defenses that had developed with regard to slaves dur-
ing the 1840s and 1850s-contributory negligence and the fellow servant doc-
trine-began to be used against whites. These defenses were especially
prominent in the two kinds of cases that would dominate the whole of late nine-
teenth century negligence law: railroad employee injuries 106 and injuries to rail-
road passengers and pedestrians at railroad crossings. 107 Analysis of these cases
reveals that the Republican Reconstruction court of the late 1860s and 1870s
moved away from the prorailroad decisions of its antebellum predecessor.
rejected Little Miami R.R. v. Stevens, 20 Ohio 415 (1815). It accepted contributory negligence and
rejected last clear chance. It applied the fellow servant rule to slaves, whereas courts of other south-
ern states chose a different rule. See supra notes 80, 86 & 90 and accompanying text.
100. "Reason" is used in the sense of "intellectual norms within the legal community," rather
than "long-range policy goals." See Comment, supra note 86, at 618. This Note argues that subtle
differences in doctrine, impelled by political conditions and beliefs, were more important than the
desire (which North Carolina shared) for a harmonious national law.
101. See, eg., Couch v. Jones, 49 N.C. (6 Jones) 402, 408 (1857); Herring, 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) at
408.
102. See C. BROWN, supra note 55, at 148-49, 188, 231-32.
103. See, e.g., Page v. North Carolina R.R., 71 N.C. 222 (1874); Jones v. North Carolina R.R.,
67 N.C. 122 (1872).
104. See, eg., Doggett v. Richmond & D.R.R., 78 N.C. 305 (1878) (fence); Troxler v. Richmond
& D.R.R., 74 N.C. 381 (1876) (fence).
105. See, eg., Capehart v. Seaboard & R.R.R., 81 N.C. 437 (1879) (bales of cotton); Smith v.
North Carolina R.R., 64 N.C. 234 (1870) (same).
106. See, e.g., Johnson v. Richmond & D.R.R., 81 N.C. 453 (1879); Dobbin v. Richmond &
D.R.R., 81 N.C. 446 (1879); Crutchfield v. Richmond & D.R.R., 76 N.C. 320 (1877); Hardy v.
North Carolina Cent. R.R., 74 N.C. 745 (1876).
107. See, e.g., Manly v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 74 N.C. 655 (1876); Lambeth v. North Carolina
R.R., 66 N.C. 494 (1872).
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Both contributory negligence and personal injury were involved in Manly v.
Wilmington & Weldon Railroad. 0 8 The decision represented the court's most
thorough early discussion of contributory negligence. In a scenario quite similar
to Herring, two black girls fell asleep on company railroad tracks near Wel-
don. 109 The engineer, who failed to see the girls until the train was only two
hundred feet from where they slept,110 was unable to stop before the train struck
and killed one of the girls.' The primary issue was whether the trial court
erred when it failed to submit an instruction to the jury on contributory negli-
gence. 112 The supreme court took the opportunity to expound on the law of
contributory negligence in North Carolina. Justice Bynum stated the rule as
follows:
[W]hen the injury arises from neither malice, design, nor wanton and
gross neglect, but simply the neglect of ordinary care, and the parties
are mutually in fault, the negligence of both being the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury, a recovery is denied upon the ground
that the injured party must be taken to have brought the injury upon
himself. 113
The significance of Manly is not that recovery could have been denied on
either negligence or contributory negligence grounds, but that Justice Bynum's
discussion reflected a sophistication that was lacking in earlier decisions. Specif-
ically, the court probed the issues of degrees of negligence 1 4 and causation.
1 15
Regarding degrees of negligence, the court maintained that negligent plaintiffs
could recover if the defendant's negligence was willful or wanton.1 16 More sig-
nificantly, the court for the first time enumerated rules that would provide re-
covery to the plaintiff if the plaintiff's negligence was only a remote rather than
the proximate cause of the injury.117 The court also recognized there could be
recovery if a plaintiff could not have avoided the accident by ordinary care. 18
Although Justice Bynum expressed concern that too much lenience toward neg-
ligent plaintiffs might be disastrous to "commercial life," it was significant that
108. 74 N.C. 655 (1876).
109. Id. at 655-56.
110. Id. at 656.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 657-58.
113. Id. at 659.
114. Id. at 658-60. Justice Bynum's opinion recognized that contributory negligence was not
uniformly applied in different jurisdictions, but ranged from extreme prodefendant positions, as in
Massachusetts, see Murphy v. Deane, 101 Mass. 455 (1869), to extreme proplaintiff positions, as in
Illinois, see Chicago & A.R.R. v. Pondrom, 51 Ill. 333 (1869). The North Carolina Supreme Court
rejected the extremes and selected a version "most approved by the decisions and most agreeable to
reason and justice." Manly, 74 N.C. at 658-59. The court continued to allow contributorily negli-
gent plaintiffs to recover whenever the defendant was guilty of willful and wanton neglect. In cases
without willful and wanton neglect, the Manly court assumed that when the parties were "mutually
in fault, there can be no apportionment of damages, no rule existing in such cases to settle what one
shall pay more than another." Id. at 659. In most states, however, the modem doctrine of compara-
tive negligence has rejected this assumption. See supra note 82.
115. Manly, 74 N.C. at 658-60.
116. Id. at 659.
117. Id. at 660.
118. Id.
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the court, particularly in distinguishing remote from proximate cause, was will-
ing to find grounds for less defendant-oriented decisions.19
During the 1870s fellow servant cases presented frustrating problems for
the court, largely because of the difficulty of devising a satisfactory definition of
just who was a fellow servant.12 0 In fact, the court on several occasions seemed
to dislike the rule set forth in Ponton.121 Justice Reade, in particular, revealed
his displeasure with the railroad's position on the issue. On a petition for rehear-
ing a railroad employee case, Hardy v. Carolina Central Railway,122 Justice
Reade admonished attorneys for the railroad that he had considered application
of the fellow servant rule in North Carolina quite carefully and still had reason
to find for the plaintiff.123 Justice Reade subsequently established an exception
to the fellow servant rule. He argued that employers, by neglect of machinery or
by employment of an unfit servant, could be barred from using the fellow ser-
vant defense.' 2 4 The court later modified this exception by holding that if the
plaintiff did not notify his employer of known defects, or if he notified his em-
ployer but knew the problems had not been remedied, he assumed the risk of
continued work.' 25 As a result, by 1880 the fellow servant rule had passed
through a period of doctrinal flexibility in which the court used great discretion
to expand or contract the rule's effect.
Greater sophistication on the issue of causation and some movement to
limit the harshness of the fellow servant rule were both evidence of a trend that
made negligence law less of a subsidy to the railroads than it had been during the
1840s and 1850s. In fact, the North Carolina decisions indicate that railroads
and plaintiffs were about equally successful in the supreme court.12 6 This was
true in cases involving personal injury, livestock accidents, and damage to other
kinds of property. As in the earlier period of general support for railroad con-
struction, the best explanation of judicial behavior in the 1870s arises out of
119. Id. at 661.
120. Justice Edwin G. Reade noted that "[w]ho is afellow servant, and what is the same employ-
ment, are often questions of difficulty, and depend upon the circumstances of each case." Hardy v.
Carolina Cent. Ry., 76 N.C. 5, 8 (1877) (per curiam).
121. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
122. 76 N.C. 5 (1877) (per curiam).
123. Id. at 7-8.
124. According to the Hardy court,
If it was the duty of the section master to be at the break and give the warning, and he
neglected his duty and allowed an excursion train full of human beings to pitch into a gorge
and cripple and kill, and the defendant [railroad] kept him employed after [it] knew of his
negligence, it makes the defendant a monster nuisance which ought to be abated by the
force of public indignation.
Id. at 8.
125. See Crutchfield v. Richmond & D.R.R., 76 N.C. 320, 323 (1877) (per curiam).
126. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text. Research uncovered few nonrailroad ap-
peals between 1869 and 1879. See Jackson v. Comm'rs of Greene County, 76 N.C. 282 (1877) (per
curiam) (repair of public bridge); Bryan v. Fowler, 70 N.C. 596 (1874) (per curiam) (duty of care of
bailee); Anderson & Young v. Cape Fear Steamboat Co., 64 N.C. 399 (1870) (per curiam) (fire
caused by sparks from steamboat); Morrison v. Cornelius, 63 N.C. 346 (1869) (per curiam) (manu-
facturer's exposure of poisonous substance to cattle). Three of the four cases were decided in favor
of the defendants. Compare Table 3, which suggests that plaintiffs and defendants were treated
similarly in all types of disputes.
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political and economic circumstances. By the 1870s, the railroad no longer en-
joyed the public favor that it had during the 1850s. One historian of North
Carolina railroads has suggested there "was a cooling of the ardor of the people"
for railroads.127 The decline in public sentiment was largely a result of the dis-
satisfaction among many Democrats and Republicans with the corruption asso-
ciated with railroad bonds in the late 1860s. 128 Although in the years
immediately following the Civil War there was great support for building new
railroads with public monies,129 by the 1870s the backlash against bond fraud
helped to push the ownership and management of the formerly state-owned rail-
roads into private hands. Increasingly, those who controlled the railroads were
northern capitalists. 130
In addition, the supreme court of the 1870s had been remade completely by
the new constitution of 1868.131 The Reconstruction constitution increased the
number of justices to five and required that they be elected by the public.132 All
eight justices who sat on the new court between 1868 and 1878 were Republi-
cans. 133 A number of these men were among the most prominent founders of
the state Republican Party, created in 1867.134 In contrast to their predecessors
in the 1840s and 1850s, the Republicans were somewhat divided in their atti-
tudes toward the railroads. As already noted, Justice Reade displayed some dis-
satisfaction with railroad defendants, 135 but other justices seemed to favor
them. 136 Correspondingly, the tort decisions of the court reflected the new and
more diverse orientation of the justices. Similarly, the rulings of the court re-
flected division within the Republican Party and the new popular ambivalence
toward the railroads. 137
127. See C. BROWN, supra note 55, at 284.
128. See J. Price, Railroads and Reconstruction in North Carolina 604-07 (1959) (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
129. Id. at 597.
130. Id. at 608.
131. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV. A determined effort to reform the State's legal institutions
characterized Reconstruction in North Carolina. The most significant change directly affecting the
supreme court was the requirement that the justices be elected by popular vote. Id. art. IV, § 26.
The Constitution of 1868 also abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity,
mandated a complete revision of civil procedure, and provided for a sweeping codification of North
Carolina law. Id. art. IV, §§ 31-3.
132. Id. art. IV, §§ 8, 26.
133. The justices were Robert Dick (1868-72); Edwin Reade (1868-79); William Rodman (1868-
79); Thomas Settle (1868-76); Nathaniel Boyden (1871-73); William Bynum (1873-79); William
Faircloth (1875-79); and Richmond Pearson (1868-78). The new state constitution and the Republi-
can majority in the electorate in 1868 ensured that the new court would be filled with Republicans.
See NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, supra note 66, at 575. Unfortunately, there is no detailed
scholarly study of this Reconstruction court.
134. They included Justices Dick, Rodman, and Settle. See H. LEFLER & A. NEWSOME, supra
note 22, at 488. Justice Dick was the first to call for organization of the new party. Id.
135. See, eg., Hardy v. Carolina Cent. Ry., 76 N.C. 5 (1877); supra notes 122-24 and accompa-
nying text.
136. See Murphy v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 70 N.C. 437, 439 (1874) (per curiam) (remarks by
Settle, J.).
137. For a recent endorsement of the view that North Carolina Republicans should be consid-
ered reformers who were able to effect "a notable and generally positive record of achievement," see
Trelease, Reconstruction: The Halfway Revolution, in THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE, supra
note 52, at 292.
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The period of Republican dominance in North Carolina was relatively
brief. As early as the election of 1870 Democrats were able to recapture the
general assembly.1 38 Although Democrats continued to lose some statewide
elections before 1876, including the governorship in 1872, by the last years of the
decade all three branches of state government were controlled by Democrats. 139
As was characteristic of many antebellum leaders, Democrats in the late nine-
teenth century were generally committed to a policy of economic development.
But by the 1880s proindustrial policy was advanced less by large public invest-
ments than by a more indirect variety of legislation.1 40 Under the rubric of
laissez-faire, Democrats slashed expenditures for education, enacted regressive
taxes, exempted railroads from taxation, and opposed any kind of legislation to
regulate industry, railroads, or working conditions.141 The State's railroad hold-
ings were sold or leased to private companies, often at low prices. 142 Combining
this economic program with racism, Democrats carried out their economic poli-
cies under the unifying banner of white supremacy. 143
The 1880s represented a turning point in North Carolina history, as rail-
road construction and industrial development began to change the State's eco-
nomic structure. 144 More railroad mileage was added during the 1880s than
had been built in the entire period between 1835 and 1880.14- Penetration of the
railroad into new areas helped bring about a revolution in agriculture and
pushed thousands of farmers into the international cotton market. Unfortu-
nately, these events increased dependence on cotton production and falling cot-
ton prices caused many of these farmers to sink into impoverished tenancy.146
On the other hand, those who were able to exploit the new market-oriented
economy prospered. Both the Dukes in Durham and Robert Reynolds of Win-
ston-Salem rose to wealth during the 1880s.147 Textile mills prospered through-
out the State's Piedmont region.' 48 By 1890, transportation, manufacturing,
and commercial agriculture had developed far beyond the expectations of even
the most optimistic mid-nineteenth-century developers.
138. See generally H. LEFLER & A. NEWSOME, supra note 22, at 487-502 (describing the polit-
ical conditions in North Carolina during Reconstruction).
139. All the judges who served between 1880 and 1894 were Democrats: William N.H. Smith
(1878-89); Augustus Merrimon (1883-92); Thomas S. Ashe (1879-87); John H. Dillard (1879-81);
Thomas Ruffin, Jr. (1881-83); Joseph J. Davis (1887-92); James E. Shepard (1889-95); Armistead
Burwell (1892-95); James MacRae (1892-95); Walter Clark (1889-1924); and Alphonso Avery
(1889-97). NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, supra note 66, at 575-76. Between 1879 and 1888 the
court was reduced to three members; after 1888 the court's size was again increased to five. Id. at
878, 887-88.
140. H. LEFLER & A. NEwSOME, supra note 22, at 542.
141. H. LEFLER & A. NEWSOME, supra note 22, at 542.
142. H. LEFLER & A. NEWSOME, supra note 22, at 516-17.
143. H. LEFLER & A. NEWSOME, supra note 22, at 543.
144. H. LEFLER & A. NEWSOME, supra note 22, at 506-07; Durden, North Carolina in The New
South, in THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE, supra note 52, at 310-14.
145. Between 1880 and 1890 railroad mileage increased from 1,486 miles to 3,001 miles. Bu-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1923, at 386 (1924).
146. Durden, supra note 144, at 314-15.
147. Durden, supra note 144, at 312-13.
148. Durden, supra note 144, at 313-14.
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The departure of Republicans from the supreme court and the ascendancy
of prorailroad Democrats coincided with a decisive shift in the development of
North Carolina negligence law. In addition, the increasing reach of the rail-
roads affected the nature and frequency of cases coming before the court. Famil-
iar complaints appeared from the owners of deceased horses, cows, and pigs-all
unfortunate victims of the locomotive. 149 Likewise, burning barns, burning
houses, and damaged crops were common. 150 However, these typical antebel-
lum and Reconstruction property cases were outnumbered by the increasing
number of instances of employee injury disputes.15 1 And employee cases were
rivaled by the number of pedestrians and passengers maimed or killed by or on
North Carolina trains. 152 Therefore, changes in the State's economy in the
1880s led to an increase in negligence and personal injury cases before the
court. 153
The political success of the Democrats 154 helped railroad defendants pre-
vail over plaintiffs twice as often in employee cases. 155 The prodefendant logic
of the new 1880s court was particularly notable in Owens v. Richmond & Dan-
ville Railroad.156 Owens, an engineer, was killed when his train ran into a mass
of debris that had fallen on the track. 157 The question before the court was
whether Owens was contributorily negligent by failing to stop the train. 158 Af-
ter considering the rules in other jurisdictions, the court held that plaintiff had
the burden not only of proving the defendant company was negligent, but also
that he himself was not negligent. 159 Chief Justice Smith emphasized that it was
not proper "to burden the defence" by presuming that the plaintiff acted with
due care. 160 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Ruffin argued that the court's rule
was "illogical" and that it rejected the "reasonable presumption, which the com-
149. See, eg., Farmer v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 88 N.C. 564 (1883).
150. See, e.g., Emery v. Raleigh & G.R.R., 102 N.C. 209, 9 S.E. 139 (1889).
151. See, eg., Patton v. Western North Carolina R.R., 96 N.C. 455, 1 S.E. 863 (1887); Pleasants
v. Raleigh & A.R.R., 95 N.C. 195 (1886); Kirk v. Atlanta & C. Air-Line R.R., 94 N.C. 625 (1886).
152. See, eg., Daily v. Richmond & D.R.R., 106 N.C. 301, 11 S.E. 320 (1890); Smith v. Rich-
mond & D.R.R., 99 N.C. 241, 5 S.E. 896 (1888); Brazil v. Western North Carolina R.R., 93 N.C.
313 (1885).
153. See Tables 4 & 5. The 1880s was also the first decade in which personal injury suits out-
numbered property damage suits. In fact, the number of personal injury suits outnumbered property
damage suits by more than two to one. Tables 4 and 5 illustrate these developments. The greatest
distinction within the railroad category is between results in personal injury cases, in which contribu-
tory negligence and the fellow servant rule had their greatest effect, and property damage cases. As
in the antebellum period, nonrailroad plaintiffs fared significantly better than railroad plaintiffs.
Railroad employees, and indeed employees generally, fared least well, as had been the case with
slaves in the 1840s and 1850s.
154. See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
155. Attorneys' strategies in these disputes varied from case to case, but if the facts permitted,
defense counsel attempted to plead both contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule. Plain-
tiffs' representatives often tried to keep out contributory negligence instructions, or to get jury in-
structions on the issue of whether the defendant had negligently hired a fellow servant. See, e.g.,
Kirk v. Atlanta & C. Air-Line R.R., 97 N.C. 82, 83-86, 2 S.E. 536, 537-38 (1887).
156. 88 N.C. 502 (1883).
157. Id. at 503-04.
158. Id. at 504.
159. Id. at 511-12.
160. Id. at 512.
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mon law always makes, that every person does his duty until the contrary is
shown."' 161 Although Owens may be an extreme example, it demonstrates a
shift in the balance of the court and a renewed willingness to place additional
burdens on plaintiffs. 162
As in the employee cases, railroads prevailed in almost two of every three
nonemployee personal injury appeals to the Democratic court. For example, in
Daily v. Richmond & Danville Railroad,163 Hiram Daily, described as an "id-
iot," wandered onto the defendant's track and was struck and injured by a
train.164 Justice Avery denied recovery. 165 First, plaintiff had been unable to
establish facts proving the negligence of defendant, largely because of plaintiff's
mental condition. 166 Second, even if he had been able to show defendant's negli-
gence, plaintiff had to escape the imputation of contributory negligence by prov-
ing the engineer knew of plaintiff's mental deficiency and thus had reason to
stop the train.167 In short, although the Owens court held that plaintiff could
not be presumed to have acted reasonably, defendant in Daily was insulated by a
holding that allowed the engineer to presume that plaintiff was acting reason-
ably. The crux of the reasoning in Daily was a policy decision that it was unnec-
essary for the engineer "to delay the train by [reducing] its speed merely because
an apparently and presumably reasonable human being was crossing at a point
far enough in his front to enable him to stop it, if he chose, before reaching such
person."' 168 On this logic, the railroad company prevailed in Daily.1 6 9
By 1890 negligence law had achieved apparent certainty. Because the law
had been developed almost entirely in railroad accident cases, the courts had
been able to craft with some particularity the respective duties of plaintiff and
defendant. Although engineers could assume that persons crossing the track
were acting reasonably, they were obligated to maintain safe speeds 170 and pro-
vide some warning at crossings. 17 1 If these requirements were met, negligence
was difficult to prove, especially because the plaintiff was held to the more uncer-
161. Id. at 517 (Ruffin, J., dissenting).
162. The decision in Owens reveals that the common law of negligence, as in the 1840s and
1850s, was more favorable to the railroads than was statutory law. Within four years the Demo-
cratic general assembly overruled Owens by placing the burdens of pleading and proving contribu-
tory negligence on the defendant. Act of Jan. 26, 1887, ch. 33, § 1, 1887 N.C. Sess. Laws 81, 81
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-139 (1983)).
163. 106 N.C. 301, 11 S.E. 320 (1890).
164. Id. at 302, 11 S.E. at 320. Plaintiff, despite his lack of mental aptitude, was not represented
by counsel. Id.
165. Id. at 306-07, 11 S.E. at 320.
166. Id. at 306-07, 11 S.E. at 321.
167. Id. at 307, 11 S.E. at 321. This part of the decision involved the doctrine of last clear
chance, which had been adopted formally in North Carolina in a nonrailroad case. See Gunter v.
Wicker, 85 N.C. 310 (1881). The doctrine allowed the negligent plaintiff to recover if the defendant
had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident. Essentially, the rule as stated by the Gunter court
seems to have had no effect on the prorailroad tendency of the court in the 1880s. Therefore, the
doctrine did no more than add a formal name to the causation issues discussed in Manly. See id. at
312; supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
168. Daily, 106 N.C. at 307, 11 S.E. at 321.
169. Id.
170. See, eg., Nance v. Carolina Cent. R.R., 94 N.C. 619, 622-24 (1886).
171. See, e.g., Troy v. Cape Fear & Y.V.R.R., 99 N.C. 298, 304, 6 S.E. 77, 80 (1888).
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tain duty to use "that degree of care and circumspection, which is necessary to
secure his safety." 172 However, as might be surmised from the shifting direc-
tions of the court between 1840 and 1880, such certainty was an illusion; largely
because of the inherent vagueness of the concepts of proximate cause and due
care, results remained subject to judicial discretion. The persistent flexibility of
negligence law was demonstrated again during the 1890s.
Unfortunately for conservative Democrats, the 1890s was perhaps the
greatest period of political and social turmoil in recent North Carolina his-
tory. 173 The basis of this upheaval lay in the financial collapse of many of the
State's smaller white farmers, who comprised a plurality of the State's popula-
tion. By 1890 they had united in a kind of rural union, the Southern Farmers'
Alliance. 174 The Alliance claimed millions of members across depressed com-
mercial farming regions of the South and the Great Plains.1 75 National Alliance
platforms demanded a government agricultural warehousing program, an end to
deflationary monetary policies, government ownership of railroads, and a
greater participation of farmers in politics. 176 In North Carolina the Alliance
established marketing cooperatives and rejected the Democratic approaches to
taxation, education, and transportation. 17 7 The Alliance supported strict state
regulation of railroad rates, equal taxation of railroads, and public funding for
public schools, and even attacked the white supremacist tenor of Democratic
politics. 178 It barred attorneys from the organization's membership rolls, and
tended to consider the profession corrupt and subservient to big business and
railroad interests. 179
Despite the rise of Alliance radicalism, some Democratic leaders were re-
luctant to accommodate farmers. Most Democrats continued to recount the
"horrors" of "black rule" during Reconstruction and to make a general appeal
to racial prejudice. 180 Alliance leaders, however, soon perceived the potential
political power of the movement and pushed it into Democratic party poli-
tics. 18 ' After a series of partial victories, including the election in 1890 of a
general assembly dominated by the Alliance, 182 the agrarians split off from the
172. Rigler v. Charlotte, C. & A.R.R., 94 N.C. 604, 609 (1886).
173. Crow, Cracking the Solid South: Populism and the Fusionist Interlude, in THE NORTH
CAROLINA EXPERIENCE, supra note 52, at 335.
174. L. STEELMAN, THE NORTH CAROLINA FARMERS' ALLIANCE: A POLITICAL HISTORY,
1887-1893 1-4 (1985). See generally R. MCMATH, POPULIST VANGUARD: A HISTORY OF THE
SOUTHERN FARMERS' ALLIANCE (1975) (a general history of the Alliance).
175. R. MCMATH, supra note 174, at 151.
176. R. MCMATH, supra note 174, at 90-91.
177. Crow, supra note 173, at 335-36; Durden, supra note 144, at 317-18.
178. L. STEELMAN, supra note 174, at 81-83.
179. See L. STEELMAN, supra note 174, at 18, 34, 65; Hunt, The Making of a Populist: Marion
Butler, 1863-1895 (pt. 2), 62 N.C. HIST. REv. 179, 185 (1985).
180. Durden, supra note 144, at 318-19.
181. L. STEELMAN, supra note 174, at 24-58.
182. See generally W. Boyette, The North Carolina Alliance Legislature of 1891: Harvest Time
for the Farmer (1984) (unpublished master's thesis, East Carolina University) (discussing predomi-
nance of Alliance members in the general assembly and their efforts to create a commission to regu-
late railroads and to assess fairly the railroad's property for tax purposes).
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Democrats in 1892 and formed the North Carolina People's Party.1 8 3 Signifi-
cantly, this new organization attempted to achieve something rarely tried in
North Carolina: a political coalition of reformers, poorer farmers, and-after a
political agreement between the Populists and the Republicans in 1894-
blacks.' 84 This "fusion" of Populists and the Republicans led to the election of
two United States senators, several congressmen, a governor, and the only two
non-Democratic general assemblies since the 1860s.185 The legislature pro-
ceeded to increase expenditures for public schools and to lower the legal rate of
interest. Reflecting the centrality of the reformers' antirailroad zeal, the general
assembly raised railroad taxes. 186 The Fusionists' desire for reform was ad-
vanced further in 1894, when a combination ticket of two Republicans, one
Democrat, and one Populist was elected to the state supreme court.18 7 By 1897
the entire court was composed of Fusionists. 88
After the new court began to sit in 1895, the prorailroad decisions of the
period of Democratic ascendancy came to an abrupt halt. Contrary to the non-
employee personal injury cases of the 1880s, the court between 1895 and 1900
ruled more than two-to-one in favor of plaintiffs.' 89 Similarly, in employee in-
jury cases the court decided disputes in favor of plaintiffs by more than a two-
to-one ratio. 190 Indeed, when for the first time nonrailroad negligence and per-
sonal injury decisions gained some importance, the Fusion court ruled against
corporate defendants in virtually every case.' 9 1 Such a spectacular change was
justified, as were earlier prorailroad decisions, on both doctrinal and policy
grounds. The Fusion court proved that it was just as "logical" and "creative" as
183. See L. STEELMAN, supra note 174, at 205-68.
184. Crow, supra note 173, at 335-37.
185. These were the general assemblies of 1895 and 1897. Crow, supra note 173, at 337-39.
186. See Trelease, The Fusion Legislatures of11895 and 1897. A Roll Call Analysis of the North
Carolina House of Representatives, 57 N.C. HisT. REV. 280, 300-01 (1980).
187. The Fusionists elected in 1894 included William Faircloth (Republican, 1895-1900); David
Furches (Republican, 1895-1901); Walter Clark (a Democrat but supported by the Fusionists, 1889-
1924); and Walter Montgomery (Populist, 1895-1905). The term of Democrat Alphonso Avery did
not expire until 1897. See NORTH CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, supra note 66, at 575-76.
188. Republican Robert M. Douglas (1897-1905) replaced Justice Avery in 1897. See NORTH
CAROLINA GOVERNMENT, supra note 66, at 576.
189. Tables 6 and 7 illustrate the about-face of the court in its position on personal injury ap-
peals-especially those of employees, who prevailed in 20 of 27 disputes. Examples of nonemployce
personal injury cases between 1895 and 1899 include Cogdell v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 124 N.C.
302, 32 S.E. 706 (1899); Mcllhaney v. Southern Ry., 122 N.C. 995, 30 S.E. 127 (1898); McLamb v.
Wilmington & W.R.R., 122 N.C. 862, 29 S.E. 894 (1898); Hinshaw v. Raleigh & A. Air Line R.R.,
118 N.C. 1047, 24 S.E. 426 (1895).
190. See, e.g., Pleasants v. Raleigh & A.R.R., 121 N.C. 492, 28 S.E. 267 (1897); Rittenhouse v.
Wilmington St. Ry., 120 N.C. 544, 26 S.E. 922 (1896). Appropriately, the death knell of the fellow
servant rule was sounded by the Fusion general assembly of 1897, which abolished the rule. See Act
of Feb. 23, 1897, ch. 56, § 1, 1897 N.C. Priv. Laws 83, 83 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-242
(1982)).
191. See, e.g., Ward v. Odell Mfg. Co., 123 N.C. 248, 31 S.E. 495 (1898) (child laborer injured at
job); Sims v. Lindsay, 122 N.C. 678, 30 S.E. 19 (1898) (child laborer injured by machinery at steam
laundry); Haynes v. Raleigh Gas Co., 114 N.C. 203, 19 S.E. 344 (1894) (child killed by electrical
current passing through wire on sidewalk). By 1900 the kinds of disputes that had elicited the first
modern negligence rules-livestock and other property damage disputes-were a minor fraction of
the total number of negligence cases. See Tables 6 & 7.
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earlier courts in both areas. Two cases-one focusing on causation, and another
reflecting policy considerations-illustrate the point.
McLamb v. Wilmington & Weldon Railroad 192 recognized what was called
"continuing negligence."' 193 Plaintiff's intestate, stranded on a thirty-foot tres-
tle, was struck and killed by defendant's train. 194 The primary question, after
plaintiff admitted negligence, was whether defendant's engineer could have
avoided the accident.195 The engineer apparently did nothing in the forty-five
seconds between seeing the victim and running over him. 196 Justice Douglas,
writing for the court, found defendant liable:
If the negligence of the defendant, even if it preceded the negligence of
the deceased, were such as to mislead the deceased, and induce or per-
mit him unknowingly to take such risk as otherwise he would not in-
cur, then the negligence of the defendant would continue in its natural
results up to the moment of the accident, and would be the proximate
cause of the injury.19 7
Justice Douglas, unlike his prorailroad predecessors, did not emphasize the
right of railroads to the absolute use of their tracks or the defendant's preroga-
tive to assume the reasonableness of the plaintiff. Instead, he argued that if there
was "any probability of danger," the engineer ought to have reduced his
speed. 198 He reasoned that "so much [was] due to the sanctity of human
life.'199
Another example demonstrating the changed values of the court was
Troxler v. Southern Railway.2° ° Plaintiff was a railway employee who received
injuries primarily because the company had failed to provide automatic car
couplers. 20 1 Justice Clark20 2 wrote an opinion that consisted mostly of a lecture
to railroads on their duty to the public and to their employees. He argued that it
was negligence per se "for the master to expose his servant to the hazard of life
or limb."'20 3 Such protection was required "unless economy of expenditures...
is to be deemed superior to the conservation of lives and limbs of those employed
in their operation. ' '2° 4 Justice Clark criticized those "who entertain sentiments
of higher allegiance to the net earnings of the [railroad] syndicates ... than to
192. 122 N.C. 862, 29 S.E. 894 (1898).
193. Id. at 873-74, 29 S.E. at 896.
194. Id. at 863, 29 S.E. at 895.
195. See id. at 874-76, 29 S.E. at 898.
196. Id. at 875-76, 29 S.E. at 898.
197. Id. at 874, 29 S.E. at 898.
198. Id. at 875, 29 S.E. at 898.
199. Id.
200. 124 N.C. 189, 32 S.E. 550 (1899).
201. Id. at 191, 32 S.E. at 550.
202. Justice Walter Clark became one of the leading American reformist judges of the early
twentieth century. See A. BROOKS, WALTER CLARK: FIGHTING JUDGE 85-101 (1944); Whichard, A
Place for Walter Clark in the American Judicial Tradition, 63 N.C.L. REv. 287, 295-98 (1985).
203. Troxler, 124 N.C. at 192, 32 S.E. at 550. Justice Clark described this negligence as continu-
ing negligence of a sort that "no contributory negligence ... will discharge the master's liability."
Id. at 191, 32 S.E. at 550.
204. Id. at 192, 32 S.E. at 550.
19881
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
those great principles which every political party professes to advocate, as being
for the best interests of the public."' 20 5 The court, reflecting prevailing political
sentiment, had moved away from the version of negligence posited by the court
in the 1880s.
Previously articulated theories20 6 of tort development cannot explain the
operation of negligence law in nineteenth-century North Carolina. The
prodefendant decisions of the Whig and conservative Democratic courts20 7 sug-
gest the deficiencies of Schwartz' "fairness" perspective20 8 and White's intellec-
tual history approach. 20 9 Moreover, Horwitz' neo-Marxist conclusions210 are
challenged in particular by the proplaintiff decisions of the Fusion court, which
was composed of capitalistic reformers. 2 11 In short, by studying closely the rela-
tionship between political change and legal fault in nineteenth-century North
Carolina, some revision of wholesale emphasis on intellectual, economic, or
"fairness" theories is necessary.212 Obviously jurists such as Ruffin, Reade,
Smith, and Clark were not equally influenced by a willingness to recognize judi-
cial "norms," subsidize railroads, or achieve an identical "economic efficiency."
Indeed, this Note demonstrates that, at least in North Carolina, there was no
single judicial response to tort law in the nineteenth century, particularly in the
important area of personal injury disputes. "Reform" periods-Reconstruction,
and especially Fusion-witnessed a decided shift both in doctrine and in results
favorable to plaintiffs. Whigs and Bourbon Democrats seemed more inclined to
support defendant railroads. Negligence rules, although initially devised by
those in favor of railroad development, were flexible enough that courts shaped
and interpreted them over time to bring about decidedly different results.
Changes in the operation of tort law in North Carolina were linked directly
to the shifting fortunes of political parties. North Carolina's five major political
parties between 1830 and 1900 represented diverse attitudes toward railroads
and industrialization. 213 The reasons that railroads were so important to poli-
205. Id. at 196-97, 32 S.E. at 552. Justice Clark's Civil War experience prompted him to com-
pare the 298 killed and 1,645 wounded in the Spanish-American War with the 1,693 killed and
27,667 "wounded" in 1897 in railroad employment. Id. at 192, 32 S.E. at 551.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 5-20.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 70-101 & 154-169.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
209. See supra text accompanying note 18.
210. See supra text accompanying note 13.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 173-91. For a recent evaluation of the Populists as
proponents of reform within capitalism, see N. POLLACK, THE JuST POLITY (1987).
212. This Note recognizes that each of these factors played a role in the development of tort law.
Indeed, despite decided fluctuations in the court's behavior, there appear to have been many cases in
each period in which the outcome was fairly certain. It was probably in the "hard" cases that
political perspective made the greatest difference. Of course, this Note also has argued that in the
nineteeth century North Carolina negligence law often was based on such vague rules that the
"hard" cases appeared at least as often as the "easy" ones. By shifting its views on competing
interests and by altering its doctrine, the court was able to create "hard" cases out of "easy" facts.
Table 8 summarizes the outcomes of railroad cases between 1840 and 1899.
213. Between 1840 and 1895 only a few cases appeared that arose out of other industrial con-
texts. These decisions were so limited that they did not reveal a definite pattern of reasoning or
outcome. In North Carolina, then, there is no clear evidence that negligence law was used as a
general subsidy to textile mills, mines, or other such operations.
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tics, economics, and tort law are obvious. The railroad was the first and most
important large industrial force in North Carolina. In contrast to some north-
ern states, other significant industries failed to develop until well after the Civil
War.2 14 Railroads also provided a deep pocket for plaintiffs. Finally, railroads
impacted on the larger public, as common carriers spread across the State in a
way an isolated textile mill could not. The connection between negligence law
and railroad politics in North Carolina suggests that the history of tort law, and
perhaps other kinds of law, should begin to take account of the interrelationship
between private law and specific political developments. More widespread rec-
ognition of this connection would contribute to a better understanding of Ameri-
can law.
JAMES LOGAN HUNT
214. H. LEFLER & A. NEWSOME, supra note 22, at 450.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1. NEGLIGENCE DECISIONS, 1840-1863
DEFENDANTS)
Interest Injured
(RAILROADS AS
Successful Litigant
Plaintiff Defendant
Slaves 1 6
Livestock 3 3
Other Property 3 4
Total Personal Injury 1 6
Total Property Damage 6 7
Total 7 13
TABLE 2. NEGLIGENCE DECISIONS, 1840-1863
(NONRAILROAD DEFENDANTS)
Successful Litigant
Interest Injured Plaintiff Defendant
Slaves 0 4
Livestock 2 2
Other Property 11 5
Total Personal Injury 0 4
Total Property Damage 13 7
Total 13 11
TABLE 3. NEGLIGENCE DECISIONS, 1869-1879
(RAILROADS AS DEFENDANTS)
Successful Litigant
Interest Injured Plaintiff Defendant
Railroad Employees 2 2
Other Personal Injury 1 2
Livestock 4 5
Other Property 5 6
Total Personal Injury 3 4
Total Property Damage 9 11
Total 12 15
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TABLE 4. NEGLIGENCE DECISIONS, 1879-1894
(RAILROADS AS DEFENDANTS)
Successful Litigant
Interest Injured Plaintiff Defendant
Railroad Employees 8 18
Other Personal Injury 16 25
Livestock 9 7
Other Property 9 11
Total Personal Injury 24 43
Total Property Damage 18 18
Total 42 61
TABLE 5. NEGLIGENCE DECISIONS, 1879-1894
(NONRAILROADS AS DEFENDANTS)
Successful Litigant
Interest Injured Plaintiff Defendant
Employees 0 2
Other Personal Injury 3 2
Livestock 0 0
Other Property 15 7
Total Personal Injury 3 4
Total Property Damage 15 7
Total 18 11
TABLE 6. NEGLIGENCE DECISIONS, 1895-1899
(RAILROADS AS DEFENDANTS)
Successful Litigant
Interest Injured Plaintiff Defendant
Railroad Employees 17 7
Other Personal Injury 24 11
Livestock 3 2
Other Property 6 4
Total Personal Injury 41 18
Total Property Damage 9 6
Total 50 24
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TABLE 7. NEGLIGENCE DECISIONS, 1895-1899
(NONRAILROADS AS DEFENDANTS)
Successful Litigant
Interest Injured Plaintiff Defendant
Employees 3 0
Other Personal Injury 8 4
Livestock 0 0
Other Property 1 0
Total Personal Injury 11 4
Total Property Damage 1 0
Total 12 4
TABLE 8. PERCENTAGES OF LITIGANT SUCCESS, 1840-1899
(RAILROAD CASES)
Years Personal Injury All Decisions
Plaintiff Defendant (n) Plaintiff Defendant (n)
1840-1863
1869-1879
1879-1894
1895-1899
14%
43
36
69
86% (7)
57 (7)
64 (67)
31 (59)
35%
44
41
68
65%
56
59
32
(20)
(27)
(103)
(74)
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